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ESTEE LAUDER INT' L. , INC. v. WORLD WIDE MARINE SERV. INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 14 January 1991 
923F.2d238 
An insurance company which authorizes its insured to issue "special marine policies" is liable to those third parties for 
whom the policies are issued regardless of the third parties' knowledge of such policy. 
FACTS: In February 1987 appellant, Estee Lauder Interna­
tional, Inc. (Estee Lauder) employed World Wide Marine 
Service Inc. lWorld Wide), a trucking company, to transport 
cosmetics from Melville, Long Island to Puerto Rico. The truck 
carrying the goods was stolen in New Jersey while on its way to 
Port Elizabeth, and only a small portion of the $180,000 worth of 
cosmetics was ever recovered. Estee Lauder received $147,000 
for the stolen cosmetics from their insurer, Commercial Union 
Insurance Companies (Commercial Union). World Wide was 
insured under an open cargo policy issued by Travelers Indemnity 
Company (Travelers). Under this open cargo policy, World Wide 
was authorized to issue "special marine policies" on Travelers' 
forms. These policies provided warehouse to warehouse "all 
risks" insurance coverage to shippers who employed World 
Wide to move their cargo. Although the open cargo policy had 
specific restrictions pertaining to the issuance of special marine 
policies, these restrictions were not printed on the special 
marine policies. Exercising their authorizaton under the open 
cargo policy, World Wide issued a special marine policy for 
$52,000 to cover the Estee Lauder cosmetics. The premiums for 
this policy were paid by World Wide. After the theft, World 
Wide immediately contacted Travelers and submitted claim 
documentation. Travelers accepted the claim documentation 
but then denied coverage on the grounds that Estee Lauder had 
other insurance and that World Wide had violated the open 
cargo policy by issuing the policy to obtain legal liability cover­
age for itself. 
Estee Lauder and its subrogated insurer, Commercial Union 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as Estee Lauder! brought 
an action against World Wide and Travelers tor the $147,000 
loss. Prior to the trial Estee Lauder tiled three motions tor 
summary judgment. The first motion, made against World 
Wide, resulted in a judgment against World Wide for the cargo 
loss. The other two motions were against Travelers to enforce 
the special marine policy. These motions were denied because 
neither party could locate a countersigned original of the docu­
ment, and the policy would not be binding without the counter­
signature. The district court held for Travelers stating that the 
special marine policy was issued but that it was unauthorized 
since World Wide had paid the policy premiums and Estee 
Lauder had never submitted a written request for the policy and 
therefore it was not binding on Travelers. 
ISSUE: Is an insurance company, which authorizes its insured 
to issue "special marine policies", liable to third parties for whom 
the policies are issued regardless of the third parties knowledge of 
such policy? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that Travelers, which had authorized World Wide to issue spe­
cial marine policies was liable to Estee Lauder, the third-party 
beneficiary to the policy. In reaching this decision the court 
relied on the district court finding that the special marine policy 
had been issued. Since the policy is a contract, the court touhd 
Estee Lauder to be a third-party beneficiary of the policy and 
therefore able to bring action to enforce the policy terms. The 
court went on to disagree with the remainder of the district 
court holding, stating it was not relevant which party paid the 
policy premiums in determining Travelers liability. The court 
also discarded the finding that the special marine policy was 
was unauthorized since Estee Lauder did not make a written 
request tor the policy as required in the open cargo policy. The 
court deemed the requirement merely a policy cond1t10n and 
that Travelers had waived this condition by accepting the policy 
premiums. Based on these findings the district court was re­
versed and Travelers was held to be bound to the special marine 
policy that World Wide issued for Estee Lauder. 
Kathleen O'Gara '92 
QUINTERO v. KLA VENESS SHIP LINES 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 16 October 1990 
914F.2d 717 
A district court may enjoin further relitigation of a choice-of-law determination made pursuant to its forum non conveniens 
dismissal of a seaman' s personl injury. 
FACTS: A Filipino sailor, Rosauro Quintero lQuinteroJ, was 
injured while unloading a Liberian-registered, Norwegian­
owned ship, the M!V Barwa, docked in the port of New Orleans. 
In September 1986, Quintero tiled suit against Torvals Klave­
ness & Co. A/S (KlavenessJ, who managed the vessel, in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana seeking damages for his injury. In 
July 1987, Quintero tiled a parallel suit for the same injuries in 
Louisiana state court, later including in his petition the four 
Norwegian interests lA/S Otra; Harald Moller Investment A/S; 
Galva Limited A/S; and Gorrissen and Klaveness A/S henceforth 
referred to as the "Barwa interests") who owned the vessel. In 
April 1988, a federal court issued a final judgment dismissing 
Quintero's suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court 
judgment and remanded the case instructing the district court 
to reconsider its decision under the doctrine established in In re 
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987), certiorari granted and judgment 
vacated, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 
1032 (1989), on remand to, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New 
Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989). 
After remand Quintero was denied a motion dismissing his 
federal suit. The district court granted Klaveness's motion to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens with prejudice after determining 
that Philippine law should govern the controversy, and further 
granted Klaveness's request for an injunction preventing Quintero 
from relitigating the choice-of-law issues in state court. Quintero 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit claiming that the district court had 
abused its discretion by enjoining him from relitigating in state 
court, in. dismissing the claim with prejudice on forum non 
conveniens, in not granting his motion for voluntary dismissal, 
and additionally, for refusing to compel Klaveness to answer 
interrogatories dealing with the choice-of-law issue. Quintero 
also claimed the district court had erred in deciding that Philippine 
law should govern and in making the choice-of-law determination 
prior to dismissal tor forum non conveniens. 
ISSUES: ( 1! Whether a district court in a maritime case may 
enjoin further relitigation in state court of a choice-of-law issue? 
(2) Whether the district court committed error in 
granting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, with 
(continued ... .) 
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prejudice after making a choice-of· law determination that Philip­
pine law should govern the controversy? 
(3) Whether the district court committed error in 
granting forum non conveniens, with prejudice after denying 
the plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal? 
( 4) Was the district court, on further discovery, after 
the case had been remanded, required to compel the defendant 
to come forward with documents after the plaintiff had been 
notified that the documents did not exist during prior discovery? 
ANALYSIS The Court of Appeals found that the district court 
had not abused its discretion by enjoining Quintero from relitigat­
ing the choice-of-law issue in state court. It held that, as a matter 
of law, the injunction was within the relitigation exception of 
the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283, as applied in Chick 
Ram Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988). The relitigation 
exception originated from a policy aimed at preventing costly 
and judicially wasteful redeterminations in state court. There 
was sufficient evidence found that the cost of relitigating either 
the choice-of-law or res judicata issues would cause irreparable 
injury. The injunction here was held not to be overbroad in 
protecting the Barwa interests as the Barwa interests were in 
privity with Klaveness. A district court may include privies of 
parties within the scope of its injunction . 
The Court of Appeals further found that a choice-of-law de­
termination in a maritime case is a determination on the merits 
and therefore may be treated as a motion for summary judgment. 
Nunez-Lozano v. Rederi, 634 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980), Unit A 
(cited only for the proposition stated). The district court, having 
determined that Philippine law governed the controversy, had 
reached the merits, therefore its dismissal on grounds of forum 
non conveniens, which included the choice-of-law determination, 
was necessarily given with prejudice. 
In determining whether dismissal for forum non conveniens 
was permissible, the Court of Appeals held that such determina­
tion was permissible as long as the plaintiff was given adequate 
protection to reinstate the action. The district court had imposed 
five prerequisites to entry of forum non conveniens so that 
Quintero could reinstate and litigate his claim in the Philip­
pines without undue inconvenience or prejudice. These five 
prerequisites required Klaveness to: (1) submit to service of 
process and jurisdiction in the appropriate forum in the Philip­
pines; (2) waive any statute of limitations defense that has 
matured since the commencement of the action in American 
courts; (3) make available all relevant documents under their 
control and all relevant witnesses who were their employees at 
the time of the accident and who remained their employees 
when the trial began in the Philippine forum; (4) agree that 
any depositions, answers to interrogatories, responses to re­
quests for production of documents, and admissions filed at the 
district court proceedings could be used in the Philippine pro­
ceeding to the same extent as if they had originated there; 
and (5) formally agree in the Philippine proceeding to satisfy 
any final judgment rendered by such court. The Court of Appeals 
held that these prerequisites adequately protected the 
plaintiffs ability to reinstate his action and a determination of 
forum non conveniens with prejudice, giving the decision pre­
clusive effect, was permissible. This effectively enjoined any 
relitigation of the district court's choice-of-law decision that the 
plaintiff may begin in a more sympathetic forum. 
In deciding that the district court had wrongly concluded that 
Philippine law applied, the Court of Appeals had to perform de 
novo review of the seven Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors. Lauritzen 
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 ( 1953); Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 
U.S. 306 (1970). Only the first factor of the test, the place of the 
wrongful act, favored the plaintiff. The injury had occurred 
aboard the vessel docked in the Port of New Orleans. Despite a 
national interest in the safe handling of cargo in United States 
ports, the Court held this factor to have little importance. The 
choice-of-law significance of'the place of the wrong act' factor is 
determined by whether the tort occurred on board the ship, not 
whether the local sovereign had an interest in preventing the 
wrongful act. The other Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors either failed 
to favor application of United States law or favored Philippine 
law. Recognizing the limited significance of the place of the 
injury, the court determined that Philippine law controlled the 
controversy. 
To reverse a district court's dismissal for forum non conve­
niens, the Court of Appeals had to find a showing of clear abuse 
of discretion. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235, 257 
(1981); In re Air Crash, 821 F.2d, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1987). The 
Court of Appeals found that the district court properly followed 
the process outlined in In re Air Crash in deciding whether 
forum non conveniens was appropriate. First, the In re Air Crash 
test required a finding that the alternative forum was both 
adequate and available. Following this, the district court had to 
weigh the various private interests in litigating in the forums, 
with deference given to the plaintiffs choice of forum. The 
district court then must weigh the public interest factors. 
Weighing of the public interest factors required a choice-of-law 
determination. Having found no error in the district court's 
determination utilizing the In reA ir Crash test, the making of a 
choice-of-law determination while deciding on forum non conve­
niens was neither erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. 
The Court of Appeals made a number of fmdings in determining 
whether there had been abuse of discretion in denying the 
plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal. Firstly, if either 
party wished to avoid having the merits of the case addressed in 
federal court, a motion for dismissal fer forum non conveniens 
did not preclude addressing the merits. As a forum non conveniens 
dismissal included a choice-of-law decision a motion for dismissal 
for forum non conveniens carried with it the potential of address­
ing the merits. Additionally, the app1ication of a federa1 injunc­
tion which enjoined further litigation of a choice-of-law issue 
did not violate considerations of federalism, nor did federalism 
require the district court to grant a voluntary dismissal under 
the facts of this case. Finally, the court held that, although a 
district court could not deny voluntary dismissal unless the 
plaintiff showed plain legal prejudice, Pullman's Palace Car Co. 
v. Central Trnsp. Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146 (1897), plain legal 
prejudice was established here. The expense of relitigation, the 
exposure to additional actions and the loss of the federal forum 
non conveniens defense which would result from a voluntary 
dismissal, created plain legal prejudice. Therefore, there existed 
no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for voluntary 
dismissal. 
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district court's decision 
not to compel the defendant to come forward to answer the 
plaintiffs two interrogatories requesting records detailing vol­
ume of trade done by Klaveness in the United States and other 
nations. At a depositon during earlier discovery a representative 
of Quintero had estimated the volume of trade Klaveness kept 
with the United States to be 10-20%. This was mere estimation. 
Klaveness kept no records from which accurate statistics could 
be derived. During additional discovery allowed by the district 
court on remand, Quintero had served the two interrogatories 
asking with which nations did Klaveness conduct more busi­
ness than the United States, and by what documents were such 
determinations made. Klaveness objected stating that it could 
not provide this information as it, as previosuly explained, had 
no such records. The district court granted Klaveness's objection. 
The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion noting that 
the district court had wide discretion in determining the scope 
and effect of discovery. 
Having made the above findings, the Court of Appeals concluded 
the rulings of the district court proper in all respects and affirmed 
the judgment. 
John Froitzheim '92 
